Large outbreaks of zoonotic influenza A virus (IAV) infections may presage an influenza pandemic. However, the likelihood that an airborne-transmissible variant evolves upon zoonotic infection or co-infection with zoonotic and seasonal IAVs remains poorly understood, as does the relative importance of accumulating mutations versus re-assortment in this process. Using discrete-time probabilistic models, we determined quantitative probability ranges that transmissible variants with 1-5 mutations and transmissible re-assortants evolve after a given number of zoonotic IAV infections. The systematic exploration of a large population of model parameter values was designed to account for uncertainty and variability in influenza virus infection, epidemiological and evolutionary processes. The models suggested that immunocompromised individuals are at high risk of generating IAV variants with pandemic potential by accumulation of mutations. Yet, both immunocompetent and immunocompromised individuals could generate high viral loads of single and double mutants, which may facilitate their onward transmission and the subsequent accumulation of additional 1-2 mutations in newly-infected individuals. This may result in the evolution of a full transmissible genotype along short chains of contact transmission. Although co-infection with zoonotic and seasonal IAVs was shown to be a rare event, it consistently resulted in high viral loads of re-assortants, which may facilitate their onward transmission among humans. The prevention or limitation of zoonotic IAV infection in immunocompromised and contact individuals, including health care workers, as well as vaccination against seasonal IAVs-limiting the risk of co-infection-should be considered fundamental tools to thwart the evolution of a novel pandemic IAV by accumulation of mutations and re-assortment.
Introduction
Influenza A viruses (IAVs) impose high morbidity and mortality burdens on humans, during recurrent seasonal epidemics and due to IAVs' ability to escape built-up herd immunity through antigenic drift [1] . Their adaptability also fuels the looming threat of antigenic shift that may lead to a novel pandemic. Influenza pandemics are caused by novel zoonotic IAVs that eventually are efficiently transmitted among humans. However, upon zoonotic transmission, animal IAVs are typically unable of sustained humanto-human transmission via the airborne route. Evolution of an airborne-transmissible variant is considered a prerequisite to the emergence of an influenza pandemic [2] .
The adaptability of IAVs is largely governed by their genetic versatility, driven by the accumulation of mutations and genome re-assortment. IAV RNA genome replication lacks effective exonuclease proofreading capability, leading to high nucleotide mutation rates [3] . In addition, IAVs' segmented genome allows for reassortment upon simultaneous infection with other IAVs, resulting in new viruses containing gene segments of mixed parental origin, e.g. with surface proteins of different subtypes. IAV re-assortment has played a key role in the emergence of past pandemic viruses [1] , and appears to occur more frequently in humans than previously appreciated [4] .
A number of IAVs circulating in swine and poultry pose substantial pandemic risks due to their widespread distribution in animal populations, and repeated zoonotic infections in humans. These include highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV)-H5N1 and low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV)-H7N9, which have caused more than 800 and close to 700 cases of zoonotic infection with mortality rates of about 50% and 40%, respectively. Despite such large numbers of zoonotic infections, which provide opportunities for these viruses to develop airborne transmissibility in humans, their efficient transmission from human to human has not yet been observed.
Experimentally, re-assortment between zoonotic and seasonal IAVs can result in the development of airborne-transmissible viruses in mammals [5] [6] [7] [8] . Also in the absence of re-assortment, the accumulation of a relatively limited number of mutations in zoonotic IAV genomes can result in their efficient transmission among mammals [9] [10] [11] [12] . The minimum set of mutations that may confer airborne transmissibility to zoonotic IAVs in humans is not known but may be informed by animal studies. For example, five mutations in the genome of HPAIV-H5N1 and HPAIV-H7N1 were sufficient for or associated with airborne transmissibility in the ferret model [9, 11, 12] . Single and double mutations belonging to these sets of five mutations have been reported to naturally occur in HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9 circulating in poultry [12, 13] . Yet, how likely the accumulation of the additional three mutations assumed to confer airborne transmissibility are to evolve, and how this compares with the likelihood of re-assortment remains unanswered [14] .
Theoretical frameworks combining IAVs' evolutionary and epidemic dynamics have been developed in recent years, shedding light on the mechanisms of seasonal IAV global evolution, largely driven by the interplay of cross-immunity and seasonality [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Most approaches explored the extent of IAVs' evolution at the level of the human population, with selection acting upon IAV transmission. Likewise, the emergence of pandemic IAVs in humans has been modeled mathematically mainly from a population-level perspective, once chains of human-to-human transmission occur [14, [22] [23] [24] .
The conditions favoring the initial evolution of transmissible variants of zoonotic IAVs within individual hosts are remarkably little understood, yet govern the first step required for the emergence of a pandemic virus. High polymerase error rate, positive within-host selection, long lasting infection or the presence of functionally-equivalent substitutions can increase the likelihood of evolution of a transmissible variant by accumulation of mutations in an individual host [13] . However, virus-host interactions, and in particular the host immune response, limits the growth of variants that evolve during infection, complicating the within-host dynamics of emergence [25] . Furthermore, uncertainties in infection, evolutionary and epidemiological processes call for the exploration of an extremely wide range of model parameter values, making the prognosis for withinhost evolution of a variant with pandemic potential a daunting task [13] .
In the present study, we address this issue by modeling the evolution of novel variants during the growth phase of viral replication, using a discrete-time probabilistic approach that explores a comprehensive range of plausible scenarios by attributing all model parameter values, specific distributions ranging between lowerand higher-bound estimates, as informed by data. We used Latin hypercube sampling for uncertainty analyses and risk quantification. The proposed approach generated quantile risk estimates of the within-host evolution of IAVs with pandemic potential, by accumulation of mutations and re-assortment.
Materials and methods
The technical details of the proposed discrete-time probabilistic model of IAV infection and evolution are provided in the Supplementary Material, and are essentially summarized below.
Within-host model of influenza virus replication growth phase
The growth phase of IAV replication during infection of an individual was assumed log-linear, in line with viral shedding curves in volunteers infected with seasonal IAVs [26] . It was considered a discrete succession of replication steps (Fig. 1) , and defined by four parameters: time of peak replication, duration of peak virus production, duration of a replication step, and number of virus copies produced during a peak replication step.
We considered IAV infection to range between the typically acute IAV infection seen during seasonal influenza in otherwise healthy individuals-with short shedding peak as early as one day post infection and prompt resolution of infection-to less typical representations observed upon zoonotic infection or in individuals with comorbidities. For example, high viral loads of HPAIV-H5N1 were reported in human patients at the time of death, occurring between four days and two weeks after illness onset [27] [28] [29] . This suggests late shedding peaks possibly maintained over a long period of time. Likewise, immunocompromised individuals typically exhibit long lasting infections with high IAV replication levels maintained over one or more weeks [30] . We thus considered IAV shedding peak to occur as late as six days post infection, and IAV peak production to be maintained for up to 14 days (Table 1) .
We assumed that the maximum number of viral copies produced at zoonotic IAV replication peak during an individual infection in humans was of the order of 10 12 to 10 14 , based on earlier estimates and on limited data on HPAIV-H5N1 viral loads in human lungs [13, 29] (Table 1) . Both the duration of IAV replication steps, and of the infectivity of IAV particles was set at 12 h, in line with experimental data [31] . We constrained the combinations of infection parameter values so that the number of infected cells at the time of peak replication did not exceed the estimated total number of respiratory epithelial cells in the human respiratory tract (Supplementary Material).
Model of virus evolution by accumulation of mutations
The probability of evolution of variants with specific sets of i mutations at each replication step was calculated using the binomial probability mass function [32] (Supplementary Information). It was essentially based on (1) the probability that a virus particle produced during a replication step has i nucleotide mutations; (2) the number of mutants with any possible combination of i nucleotide mutations; and (3) the total number of wild-type and mutant virus copies produced during that replication step (Fig. 1) . The probability of evolution by accumulation of mutations thus depended on the following parameters: IAV polymerase error rate, wild-type replication rate and mutant relative replication rates.
The influenza polymerase error rate is in the order of 10 −5 per nucleotide per genome replication [3] . Based on the distributions of unique equine and swine mutant IAVs rescued from experimentally infected and unvaccinated horses and pigs, respectively [33, 34] (Fig. 2) , we assumed that it may take any value between 10 −5.2 and 10 −4.2 per nucleotide per genome replication (Table 1 ). This range allowed accounting for uncertainties in probability distributions and biological heterogeneities, including variable mutation rate within and across IAV gene segments, possibly affecting the accumulation of mutations (Supplementary Material).
Most mutations occurring during IAV replication may be deleterious, resulting in no further replication of IAV mutants. However, some polymerase gene mutations marking adaptation of avian IAVs to mammals can increase mutant replication by factors ranging between 0.5 and 1.0 log [35, 36] . Accordingly, the mutant relative replication rates were assumed to take any value between the lower-bound estimate of zero (corresponding to deleterious mutations) and the higher-bound estimate of 10 (corresponding to a log increase in mutant replication compared to that of the wild-type virus; Table 1 ).
We used a discrete-time multi-type branching process [37] to estimate the number of mutants with 1-5 mutations. The numbers of variants with specific sets of 1-5 mutations were expressed as a function of the time to zoonotic IAV peak replication. Numbers of variants with specific sets of 1-5 mutations that were below one at any given replication step corresponded to their probability of evolution in one individual at that replication step.
We further evaluated the numbers of variants with specific sets of 1-5 mutations when IAV peak production levels were maintained, under conditions characteristic of immunocompetent and immunocompromised individuals (Supplementary Material). We recently showed that in immunocompetent individuals, the growth of variants that evolve during infection is limited by the host immune response, with the absence of variant growth at and after peak replication of the wild-type virus [25] . In contrast, in immunocompromised individuals, the growth of variants is unaffected, and independent of the time of their evolution. Consequently, in immunocompetent individuals, each mutant virus particle was assumed to give rise to one new virion at each peak replication step, independently of the mutant replication rate, because of immunemediated control (Fig. 1) . In immunocompromised individuals, mutant viruses were assumed to replicate at full replication rate, up to peak replication levels comparable to that of the wild-type virus ( Fig. 1) . Although viral titers tend to reach higher levels in immunocompromised individuals [30] , we constrained each variant's replication to the corresponding wild-type virus peak level of 10 12 -10 14 virus particles for comparison purposes.
Virus evolution by re-assortment
Individuals with zoonotic influenza may become co-infected with seasonal IAV, or vice versa, providing opportunities for reassortment. We first calculated the probability of evolution of a specific re-assortant between zoonotic and seasonal IAVs upon co-infection. The probability of evolution of a specific re-assortant at each replication step was based on (1) the number of cells infected during the previous replication step; (2) the probability that a cell is infected with two or more IAV virions; (3) the probability that IAVs with gene segments of mixed parental origin are produced; (4) the total number of possible re-assortants; and (5) the re-assortant relative replication rate. The probability of evolution by re-assortment thus depended on the following parameters: the time of peak replication and the peak numbers of zoonotic and seasonal IAVs, which themselves define the peak number of infected cells and the replication rates of the wild-type viruses (Supplementary Material), and the re-assortant relative replication rate.
The probability that a cell is infected with one or more IAV particles depends on the multiplicity of infection [32] , which is essentially equal to the percentage of infected cells (Supplementary Material). The probability that upon co-infection, a virion produced by an infected cell harbors either full parental genomes, or any combination of gene segments of mixed origin, is governed by the proportion of zoonotic and seasonal IAV upon co-infection. We considered that either both zoonotic and seasonal IAVs initiated co-infection at T = 0, or that infection with seasonal IAV occurred one or more replication steps after infection with the zoonotic IAV. Estimated co-infection rates were similar to those found in vitro for low multiplicities of infection [38, 39] .
The re-assortant relative replication rates were assumed to take any value between the lower-bound estimate of zero (corresponding to re-assortment mismatch) and the higher-bound estimate of 10 (corresponding to a log increase in re-assortant replication compared to that of the parental zoonotic virus; Table 1 ). Numbers of specific re-assortants that were below one at any given replication step corresponded to their probability of evolution in one individual at that replication step.
Co-infection with zoonotic and seasonal IAVs
Only co-infection with different IAVs inoculated less than 24 h apart produced viable re-assortants in vitro and in animal models [38, 40] . The risk of evolution of specific re-assortants was thus assumed to depend on the daily (24 h) probability that an individual with zoonotic influenza is co-infected with seasonal IAV. Because of such short delay between infection with both zoonotic and seasonal IAVs, it is unlikely that the individual already shows severe signs or symptoms of zoonotic influenza that may alter his/her exposure risk at the time of co-infection with seasonal IAV. We therefore assumed independence between the two events.
The probability of co-infection, given previous infection with zoonotic IAV, was based on the seasonality and relative attack rates of seasonal IAV in children and adults. Based on published epidemiological studies [41] [42] [43] , the average attack rate of seasonal IAV typically ranges between 5% and 20% and has been estimated at an average of 15% (SD = 3%) in individuals <18 years old (children) and at an average of 7% (SD = 2%) in individuals ≥18 years old (adults) [41] . Using sentinel data of seasonal IAV infection from the WHO FluNet database (http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs laboratory/ flunet/), we determined the daily proportion of annual cases of seasonal IAV infection in the respective WHO regions. Because both HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9 are endemic in poultry populations in China, we used data from the northern West Pacific region (WPROn), which includes China, Japan, Mongolia and the Republic of Korea, for the calculations of the risk of co-infection (Supplementary Material).
Sensitivity analyses and quantitative risk assessment
Sensitivity analyses and risk estimate ranges were assessed by Latin and conditioned Latin hypercube sampling (LHS and CLHS, respectively) of the model parameters [44, 45] . Briefly, each of the model parameters was assigned a uniform or gamma distribution ranging from the lower-to higher-bound parameter estimates ( Table 1 ). The number of simulations was set at 10,000: each of the distributions was divided into non-overlapping equi-probable intervals, creating 10,000 sets of stratified randomly sampled parameter values. Each set corresponded to a unique plausible combination representing one individual in a virtual population of 10,000.
The age distributions of HPAIV H5N1 and LPAIV H7N9 cases of zoonotic infection in humans differ markedly, with 53% and 8% of reported cases in individuals of less than 18 years old, respectively [46, 47] . Accordingly, each of the 10,000 virtual individuals was further assigned an age category following a ratio of 1.12 children to 1 adult when a zoonotic infection with HPAIV H5N1 was assumed. The ratio was 0.08:1 when a zoonotic infection with LPAIV H7N9 was assumed. Each of these virtual individuals was defined as immunocompetent or immunocompromised, with a ratio of 49:1, based on available estimates of the proportion of immunocompromised individuals in the general population [25, 48] , when infection with HPAIV-H5N1 was assumed [49] . The ratio was 3:2 when infection with LPAIV-H7N9 was assumed, to reflect observed proportions of LPAIV-H7N9 infected individuals with underlying conditions [50] . Lastly, co-infection with seasonal IAV was assumed to occur-with equal probability-0 h, 12 h or 24 h after infection with the zoonotic IAV.
For each of the virtual individuals, we calculated (1) the probability of evolution of a variant with a specific set of 1-5 mutations and (2) the probability of evolution of a specific re-assortant upon co-infection with HPAIV H5N1 or LPAIV H7N9 and seasonal IAV. We used bootstrap resampling to select 900 individuals from the virtual population of 10,000 and repeated the process 10,000 times. For each bootstrap sample, we randomly selected up to ten individuals with the highest probability of evolution of a variant with a specific set of 1-5 mutations or with the highest probability of evolution of a specific re-assortant. We then determined the distributions of these probabilities-throughout the growth phase of infection. This process generated quantile risk estimates that variants with specific sets of 1-5 mutations and specific re-assortants evolve in at least one individual after 900 cases of zoonotic infections with either HPAIV H5N1 or LPAIV H7N9.
Results

Infection dynamics
The LHS and CLHS of IAV time and duration of peak replication resulted in comparable IAV growth curves with different proportions of late peaks and long peak plateaus (Figs. 2 and S1 ). The constraints on the combinations of the infection model parameters led to skewed distributions of time and duration of peak replication toward lower values. Such distributions are not unlike observed timelines of IAV infection in humans [26] . In general, the highest numbers of virus copies produced at peak replication were associated with early replication peak, high replication rates and low peak proportions of infected cells. The relationships between the time and duration of peak replication, peak number of virus copies, peak proportion of infected cells and replication rate are shown in Fig. S2 .
The numbers of variants with specific sets of 1-5 mutations generally increased with the time of peak replication of the wild-type virus (Fig. S3) , with the duration of peak wild-type virus production (Fig. S4) , with the peak number of wild-type virus copies (Fig.  S5) , with the polymerase error rate (Fig. S6 ) and with the respective mutant replication rate (Fig. S7) . Interestingly, the replication rate of single mutants had more impact on the growth of any mutant than the respective mutant replication rates (Fig. S8) . Conversely, the polymerase error rate had increasingly more impact on the number of variants with more than one mutation than on the number of single mutants (Fig. S6) .
The numbers of specific re-assortants generally increased with the time of peak replication of the zoonotic virus (Fig. S9) , with the peak number of wild-type virus copies (Fig. S10) , with the peak number of infected cells (Fig. S11) and with the re-assortant replication rate (Fig. S12) . The duration of peak wild-type virus production had little impact on the numbers of specific re-assortants (Fig. S13) .
Risk of evolution by accumulation of mutations
The range of parameter values explored in the LHS-and CLHS-based models resulted in relatively high variability in the probability distributions of evolution of variants with specific sets of 1-5 mutations. Median values will be indicated in the text, while quantiles will be reported in Table 2 and Table S1 . In general, the CLHS-based model resulted in lower probability of evolution of variants with specific sets of 1-5 mutations. This was largely due to Table 2 Quantile probability of evolution and growth of variants with specific sets of 1-5 mutations at wild-type IAV replication peak (CLHS-based model). the skewer distributions of time and duration of peak replication of the wild-type virus, and of the mutant relative replication rates, toward lower values.
#
Immunocompetent individuals
Both LHS-and CLHS-based models indicated a substantial risk of evolution, in one infected individual, of IAV with pandemic potential, when accumulation of 1-2 mutations was sufficient to confer airborne-transmissibility (Table 2) . Variants with specific single and double mutations evolved in most individuals, when wild-type zoonotic IAV reached about 40% and 80% of wild-type virus peak replication levels, respectively (Figs. 3 and S14) .
Specific single and double mutants that evolved before wildtype virus peak replication further grew and replicated to a median of 72% and 38% of wild-type virus peak replication levels, respectively, in the LHS-based model (Table 2) . They grew and replicated to a median of 63% and 24% of wild-type virus peak replication levels, respectively, in the CLHS-based model (Table 2) .
In both LHS-and CLHS-based models, variants with specific sets of four or more mutations were unlikely to evolve during infection of an immunocompetent individual. The median probability of evolution of variants with specific sets of four mutations was, at the time of wild-type virus peak production, ≤0.001% in both types of model (Figs. 3 and S14; Table 2 ).
By contrast, the likelihood that specific triple mutants evolved during infection in an immunocompetent individual proved highly uncertain. Variants with specific sets of three mutations evolved in most individuals in the LHS-based model, while the median probability that they evolved in one individual was 1% in the CLHS-based model ( Figs. 3 and S14 ; Table 2 ). Because they generally evolved at 
. Growth curves (top) and probability (bottom) of evolution of specific re-assortants when both zoonotic and seasonal IAV initiated infection (light gray) to co-infection with a delay of up to 48 h (darker gray) in an immunocompetent individual (CLHS-based model). Data-points beyond x = 0.1 (top) and last boxplot (bottom) in each graph
insert represent values at the end of the plateau phase of peak viral production (pl.).
Table 3
Quantile probability of evolution and growth of specific re-assortants at wild-type IAV replication peak (CLHS-based model). the time of wild-type virus peak replication, their further growth was limited. They replicated to a median of 3% of wild-type virus peak replication levels in the LHS-based model (Table S1 ).
Immunocompromised individuals
The replication of IAV variants was unimpeded during the period of wild-type virus peak production in immunocompromised individuals. This resulted in the evolution and/or growth to high replication levels of variants with specific sets of 1-5 mutations in most individuals in the LHS-based model (Figs. S15 and S16). Variants with specific sets of 3-5 mutations reached ≥80% of the wild-type peak replication levels by the end of the plateau phase in that model (Table 2) .
Variants with specific sets of three mutations evolved in most immunocompromised individuals in the CLHS-based model, and grew and replicated to a median of 25% of the wild-type peak replication levels. The median probability that variants with specific sets of four and five mutations evolved in one immunocompromised individual, during the peak virus production phase was 0.6% and <0.0001%, respectively, in that model (Table 2 ).
Risk of evolution by re-assortment
Immunocompetent individuals
Any possible re-assortant was generated in most immunocompetent individuals, at about 60% and 80% of wild-type IAV peak replication levels, in the LHS-and CLHS-based model, respectively, when both zoonotic and seasonal IAVs initiated infection at T = 0 (Figs. 4 and S17) . Specific re-assortants that evolved before IAV peak replication, further grew and replicated to a median of 68% and 45% of peak replication levels, respectively (Table 3) .
Specific re-assortants continued to evolve when the seasonal IAV initiated infection 12-48 h after infection with the zoonotic IAV, yet for a decreasing proportion of LHS and CLHS parameter combinations (Fig. 5) . This is not unlike what has been described in vitro and in vivo [38, 40] . In the LHS-based model, specific reassortants evolved in most immunocompetent individuals, and replicated to a median of 11-48% of wild-type virus peak replication levels (Table S2 ). In the CLHS-based model, the median probability that specific re-assortants evolved during infection decreased with the delay between infection with the zoonotic and seasonal IAVs, from 70% when the delay was 12 h to 14% when the delay was 48 h (Table 3 ).
Immunocompromised individuals
Specific re-assortants had a higher probability to evolve in immunocompromised than in immunocompetent individual at the time of peak virus production. They replicated to higher Table 4 Quantile risk estimates of evolution and growth of mutants with pandemic potential at wild-type IAV replication peak after 900 cases of zoonotic IAV infection (CLHS-based model of HPAIV-H5N1 infection). Table 5 Quantile risk estimates of evolution and growth of re-assortants with pandemic potential at wild-type IAV replication peak after 900 cases of zoonotic IAV infection (CLHS-based model).
Host status
Minimum 5% Median 95% Maximum
0.27% (100%) † Percentage of peak replication log levels reached at replication peak indicated between brackets; CP: immunocompetent, IC: immunocompromised.
levels, in both the LHS-and CLHS-based models (Figs. S18 and S19; Tables 3 and S2 ).
Quantitative risk estimates of evolution of a novel pandemic IAV by accumulation of mutations and by re-assortment
HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9 have caused more than 800 and close to 700 cases of zoonotic infection, respectively. Using the LHSand CLHS-based models described above, we determined the risk of evolution of IAV with pandemic potential by accumulation of mutations and by re-assortment after 900 cases of zoonotic infection, as an example. To this end, we used bootstrap resampling of the LHSand CLHS-generated combinations of parameter values. The results were comparable for HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9, although the high proportion of immunocompromised individuals in the population infected with LPAIV-H7N9 resulted in more variable results (Figs. 6 and S20-S22 ).
The models produced high risks of evolution of variants with pandemic potential by accumulation of specific sets of 1-5 mutations at the time of peak virus production (Figs. 6 and S20-S22). The contribution of immunocompromised individuals in generating variants with pandemic potential increased with the number of mutations required for airborne-transmissibility (Fig. 5) . In particular, all the individuals at the origin of the evolution of variants with specific sets of 4-5 mutations in each of the bootstrap samples were of immunocompromised status. In these individuals, variants with 1-5 mutations replicated to a median of 78-84% of wild-type peak replication levels, in the LHS-based model (Table S3) . They replicated to a median of 29-77% of wild-type peak replication levels, in the CLHS-based model (Table 4) .
In immunocompetent individuals, variants with specific sets of one, two and three mutations replicated to a median of 71%, 38%, and 7% of wild-type peak replication levels, respectively, in the LHSbased model (Table S3) . They replicated to a median of 63%, 24%, and 3% of wild-type peak replication levels in immunocompetent individuals, respectively, in the CLHS-based model (Table 4) .
The median risk that co-infection with seasonal IAV occurred and that a re-assortant with pandemic potential evolved in at least one individual after 900 cases of zoonotic infection was of the order of 0.02-0.1% for either HPAIV-H5N1 or LPAIV-H7N9 (Tables 5 and S4 ). Re-assortants replicated up to 40-80% of wild-type peak replication levels in immunocompetent and immunocompromised individuals (Tables 5 and S4 ).
Discussion
Quantifying the risk of evolution of a novel pandemic IAV, enabling informed assessment of the likelihood of this public health threat, is essential to support the implementation of pandemic preparedness plans and policy decisions. For example, such quantitative framework may assist in the identification of individuals most at risk of generating airborne-transmissible variants, calling for the implementation of relevant isolation and handling measures. The proposed approach allowed the computation of quantitative risk estimates of the evolution of a transmissible IAV during infection with zoonotic IAV, as a function of the number of cases in humans. Similar evolutionary mechanisms likely drive the evolution of IAVs in animal reservoirs, including mammalian species such as the pig. However, zoonotic IAVs of avian or swine origin typically cause sporadic infections in humans with limited further onward transmission. They do not seem to acquire the ability to be transmitted among humans via the air, despite their widespread prevalence in animals, possibly due to different selection pressures. We therefore only considered the evolution of this trait in the human host. Because of uncertainties in infection, evolutionary, and epidemiological processes, absolute risks cannot at present be assessed. In the present study, quantile risk estimates were derived, by creating a virtual population of a large number of combinations of model parameter values within best-known estimates of their plausible range, and by repeatedly sampling this population to generate risk distributions.
Although we accounted for variability in replication processes and epidemiological dynamics, a number of caveats arose, due to uncertainties that still cannot be fully captured. The distributions of some of the model parameters call for more precise empirical assessments that would allow narrowing the present risk estimate ranges. Furthermore, variations in quasi-species fitness and interference between variants, e.g., immune-or resourcemediated, may directly affect the emergence of a transmissible mutant or re-assortant [25, 51] . The polymerase error rate may vary within and across gene segments, and not all re-assortment combinations may have equal propensity to evolve [38, 40] . Spatial heterogeneities of IAV infection and mixing patterns within hosts, ignored here, are particularly important areas for future empirical studies, as they may limit the extent of re-assortment within hosts. Although the results of the present study are in line with recent experimental data on re-assortment [38, 40] , the use of spatial models of the respiratory tract [52] may be warranted. At the population level, complex seasonal IAV epidemiological dynamics, not captured by average attack rates [22] , may further influence the probability of co-infection. These include in particular spatial and temporal variability in mixing patterns and individual variability in susceptibility to infection and disease. We partially addressed this issue with the use of gamma distributions of seasonal IAV attack rates. The ratio of immunocompromised individuals in the modeled populations was based on general estimates that do not reflect the amount of variability in the actual level of immune control of infection. Lastly, the models only explored the risk of evolution of variants with pandemic potential in individual hosts and did not address their further transmission from human to human, which is the next determining step in the risk of emergence of an influenza pandemic. Greater quantitative understanding of the relationships between viral loads, distribution of IAVs along the human respiratory tract and their onward transmission from human to human will be required to take on such an endeavor.
Despite these caveats, our results nonetheless provide indicative range estimates and robust relative risk estimates of the likelihood that IAV with pandemic potential evolves by accumulation of mutations or re-assortment in individual hosts. In particular, they provided risk estimate ranges according to the immune status of infected individuals, bearing in mind that intermediate ranges likely are to be expected due to wide variability in the level of immune control in immunocompetent and immunocompromised individuals.
So far, at least three to five mutations are thought necessary to confer airborne transmissibility to some strains of HPAIV H5N1 [9, 11, 12] . As an example, the proposed framework establishes that the evolution of a variant with pandemic potential by accumulation of three mutations would likely occur in at least one individual among 900 cases of infection (Table 4) . However, the mutant may reach limited titers corresponding to about 3% (IC95: 0.3-8%) of the log titers of the wild-type virus at peak replication in immunocompetent individuals. In contrast, the risk of evolution of a variant with pandemic potential by accumulation of 4-5 mutations among 900 cases of infection was <0.001% (<0.001-0.005%) in immunocompetent individuals. Conditions of immunodeficiency resulted in the likely evolution of variants with 3-5 mutations among the 900 cases of infection, with titers reaching up to 77% (44-92%) for triple mutants, 58% (10-95%) for variants with 4 mutations and 54% (3-95%) for variants with 5 mutations.
While the risk of co-infection with both zoonotic and seasonal IAVs in at least one individual among 900 cases of zoonotic infection reached the order of 0.02-0.04% (0.0004-0.2%), reassortants were likely to evolve upon co-infection (Table 5 ). They could grow to levels corresponding to 18-52% (0.8-93%) of the log titers of the wild-type viruses at peak replication, in immunocompetent and immunocompromised individuals alike.
These results hereby complete earlier risk assessments of evolution, emergence and transmission of pandemic influenza viruses. The LHS-and CLHS-based models provided largely comparable results, attesting the robustness of the approach. In essence, three main conclusions may be drawn from the results of the present study.
First, the models strongly suggest that immunocompromised individuals are at high risk of generating IAV variants with pandemic potential by accumulation of mutations. In all bootstrap samples, immunocompromised individuals were invariably at the origin of the evolution of variants with specific sets of four and five mutations. They also made a large proportion of the individuals at the origin of the evolution of specific triple mutants. In developed countries, an estimated 2% of the population is immunocompromised, and on-going aging and increase in the immunocompromised portion of the human population, including in developing countries, are causes for concern [25, 48] .
Second, higher replication levels of single and double mutants may represent an important risk for the generation of a virus variant with pandemic potential, along short chains of human-tohuman transmission. Because they evolve early during infection, they reach relatively high replication levels in both immunocompetent and immunocompromised individuals. Rare human-to-human transmission of zoonotic IAVs associated with unusually intense contacts [53] may result in their transmission. Subsequent evolutionary processes leading to 1-2 additional mutations are to be expected in secondary cases. These could complete the genotype of a fully-transmissible variant, expanding the risk of evolution by accumulation of mutations, supporting earlier models of population-level emergence of infectious diseases [14, 24] . It is tempting to speculate that the results of the present models likely apply to other mammalian species, such as swine, cats and dogs. Chains of transmission in these species may contribute to the evolution of variants with pandemic potential by accumulation of mutations, provided that selective pressures are similar to those in humans.
Third, although the risk of evolution of IAV with pandemic potential by re-assortment appeared overall lower than the risk of evolution by accumulation of mutations, re-assortants evolved early during infection, and reached high peak replication levels in both immunocompetent and immunocompromised individuals. This may facilitate their subsequent transmission to a new individual. Although a rare event, co-infection with zoonotic and seasonal IAV less than 24 h apart would likely give rise to a wide diversity and high viral loads of re-assortants, some of which with pandemic potential. This may spark chains of human-to-human transmission. Interestingly, the higher range estimates of the risk of evolution of a variant with pandemic potential by re-assortment were in line with past inter-pandemic periods ranging between 9 and 41 years [1] .
Some HPAIV-H5N1 isolates have demonstrated binding affinity for cellular receptors commonly used by seasonal IAVs [53] . They may infect the same cell type and re-assort in humans. Of particular concern, LPAIVs-H7N9, in contrast to HPAIVs-H5N1 and most other avian IAVs, consistently bind to the cellular receptors used by seasonal IAVs [54] , and thus may readily re-assort upon co-infection. A majority of both HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9 cases of zoonotic infection have occurred during January-March, corresponding to high seasonal IAV activity in the Northern hemisphere (Fig. S23) . In this light, the patients infected with HPAIV-H5N1 or LPAIV-H7N9, who traveled from China to Canada in winter 2014 and winter 2015, respectively [55, 56] , during high seasonal influenza activity, illustrates that the risk of co-infection and re-assortment is not only theoretical.
Prompt diagnosis, strict isolation, monitoring and antiviral treatment of patients with zoonotic influenza is warranted to limit the risk of evolution of a novel pandemic IAV. In particular, strict isolation measures and early antiviral treatment are essential to prevent or limit zoonotic IAV infection in (hospitalized) immunocompromised individuals, as well as in contact individuals, including health care workers and relatives. Importantly, vaccination against seasonal IAVs may reduce the risk of co-infection, and thus may represent a fundamental tool to prevent the evolution of a novel pandemic IAV by re-assortment.
